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Kinto is an Orbit stack L2 with account abstraction and KYC enabled for all users, supporting both modern financial institutions and decentralized protocols.
Kinto is an Orbit stack L2 with account abstraction and KYC enabled for all users, supporting both modern financial institutions and decentralized protocols.
Mainnet full launch
2024 May 22nd
Engen mining is completed and locked funds are bridged to the Kinto L2.
Kinto Mainnet Genesis
2023 Dec 15th
Kinto mainnet is launched. Deposits by users are disabled.
Fraud proofs allow 5 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.
Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling stakeOnExistingNode
or stakeOnNewNode
. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.
Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).
A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the startChallenge
function. Validators cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with partial concurrency. Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to delay attacks, where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge period of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.
While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
When a user initiates a regular withdrawal a third party verifying the chain can offer to buy this withdrawal by paying the user on L1. The user will get the funds immediately, however the third party has to wait for the block to be finalized. This is implemented as a first party functionality inside Arbitrum’s token bridge.
Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.
Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.
Funds can be lost if there are mistakes in the highly complex Nitro and WASM one-step prover implementation.
Central actors allowed to submit transaction batches to L1.
They can submit new state roots and challenge state roots. Some of the operators perform their duties through special purpose smart contracts.
This is a Gnosis Safe with 6 / 9 threshold. Multisig that can execute upgrades via the UpgradeExecutor.
Those are the participants of the ExecutorMultisig.
This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 5 threshold. Multisig that can upgrade the Bridger gateway contract. It also owns the Socket contracts used as escrows for bridged assets.
Those are the participants of the BridgerOwnerMultisig.
EOA privileged to call depositBySig()
on the Bridger gateway to deposit assets to the L2 using pre-signed transactions from users.
Main contract implementing Arbitrum One Rollup. Manages other Rollup components, list of Stakers and Validators. Entry point for Validators creating new Rollup Nodes (state commits) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs.
Contract managing Inboxes and Outboxes. It escrows the native token used for gas on the chain. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.
Implementation used in:
Main entry point for the Sequencer submitting transaction batches.
Contract allowed to upgrade the system.
Implementation used in:
Contract that allows challenging invalid state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy.
Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.
Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.
Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.
Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.
Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.
Contract managing Inboxes and Outboxes. It escrows ETH sent to L2.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).